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Soviet Theory of Jurisprudence
Francis G. Homan, Jr.*
A NY EXAMINATION OF MARXIAN THEORY and its embodiment
in Soviet jurisprudence must first review its roots in
Hegelian philosophy. Bolshevism, Fascism and National Social-
ism have all relied on Hegelian theory, with tremendous political
impact on modern history.
The essence of Hegel's philosophy is its emphasis on history
and the historical aspects of all human endeavors as evidenced
by the see-saw battle between freedom and tyranny. Perceiving
a pattern in historical events which seemed to be capable of pre-
diction, Hegel deduced that all history could be thus categorized.
He saw history as a dialectical progression based on the two op-
posing forces of man and nature and their ultimate realization
in the spirit of history. This concept was distilled into the now
famous axiom: "thesis-antithesis-equals synthesis." Hegel in-
sisted that all history could be explained on the basis of this prin-
ciple and his concept of the state was consistent with it.
To Hegel the state was not a part but the very essence, the
basic unit of history. He rejected the idea of historical life out-
side and before the existence of the state. The state is, for Hegel,
not representative but the very incarnation of the "spirit of the
world."
Thus, Hegel attacked the "natural right" or "social compact"
theories extant in his day which held that the state originates in
a contract and is bound to certain conditions, to legal and moral
considerations. This idea was contrary to what Hegel viewed as
the Divine Idea, i.e., the state with its concomitant absolutism,
and his rejection of the concept of individual morality as a uni-
versal law. Hegel's state acknowledges no abstract rules of good
and evil. There is no moral obligation for the state's universal
will, only for the individual will. The duty of the state is self
preservation and, thus, Hegel favored a state organized in a
totalitarian manner which would develop in the highest degree
the spirit of history. He did not reject the notion of freedom but
maintained that true freedom could only be realized through its
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embodiment in the state. Individual freedom, in Hegel's view,
is synonymous with identification with the state and "obedience
to the law." Abstractions such as justice and morality have no
existence apart from reality (which is identical with reason).
The existence of the state is its own justification and its laws are
those of self preservation. The citizen's morality is to obey and
thus achieve freedom through identification with the state.
Thus, Hegel extolled the truth which lies in power. He de-
clared that men were foolish to forget, in their enthusiasm for
individual freedom, the truth which lay in power. That these
ideas contain the nucleus of the ruthless and coercive programs
of the modern totalitarian state need hardly be explained.
Hegelianism and the liberalism of the Lockean philosophers
are diametrically opposed. For Hegel the state is in itself good,
its citizens matter only insofar as they minister to the glory of
the whole. Liberalism, on the other hand, regards the state as
serving the individual needs of its various members. In practical
application, the Hegelian view supports intolerance, ruthlessness
and tyranny. The liberal philosophy fosters consideration, toler-
ance and compromise.
Karl Marx, a late contemporary of Hegel, was strongly in-
fluenced by Hegel during his university days. After his exile
from his homeland, he used Hegelian philosophy as a spring-
board for the development of his own theories. Marx was sim-
ilarly preoccupied with the state as the basic unit of history
rather than the individual and his theories were directed toward
the reformation of the entire political system rather than the
correction of individual problems. Marx adopted Hegel's histor-
ical view of social development. His approach is connected with
the dialectic. Hegel, as we have noted, conceived the course of
history as a gradual self-realization of the spirit which strives
toward the Absolute. The passions and ambitions of individuals
are the material from which the state derives its vital force. This
individual spirit is synthesized in the state. Marx substituted the
economic motivation of man for Hegel's spirit and the classless
society for Hegel's Absolute. A competitive system of produc-
tion, according to Marx, will in time produce internal tensions
between the various social classes that are linked to it. These
contradictions, as Marx called them, are resolved into a higher
synthesis. The form which the dialectic struggle takes is the
class war. The resolution of the struggle is synthesis in the
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classless society. Once this has been attained, the conflicts dis-
appear and the dialectic process fades away.
Because Marxist doctrine is Hegelian in method, Marx
called his own theory "dialectic materialism."
Marxian theory explains society in terms of the mutual
relations into which men enter when engaged in the material
means of production. These relationships are conditioned by the
forces of economics. The attitude of the individual is formed by
his relative position in these socio-economic groups, i.e., his
class-status. The general attitude of men toward social problems
is based on the relative position of their class in society. Finally,
the history of mankind, since the rise of social classes, is ex-
plained as a history of class struggle.
Marx regarded the non-socialist states as dependent upon,
and serving as a reinforcement of, these fundamental class divi-
sions. Thus, Engels, the alter-ego of Karl Marx, defined the state
as the preservation of the status quo. Given the basic antag-
onisms between classes with conflicting and irreconcilable eco-
nomic differences, the state's role is to keep them in check. Since
the most economically powerful class holds the reins of political
power, it uses the law as a means to further exploitation of the
oppressed classes. This is true even where the law appears to be
adverse to the interests of the individual members of the ruling
class and to advance the apparent interests of the oppressed
classes. For example, legislation regulating the employment of
children in certain industries, by safeguarding the health of the
younger generation of workers and by preventing unsound meth-
ods of competition between capitalists, really serves the interests
of capitalist society.
Thus, as long as there is a class society there is class justice.
Judges perform the function of preserving the existing structure
of society. In a non-socialist system they must and do interpret
all ambiguities in the law in harmony with the concept of pre-
serving the order of the ruling classes.
The state, according to both Marx and Engels, is an instru-
ment of coercion to be ultimately used by the victorious work-
ing-classes to expropriate the former ruling class and break the
resistance to the formation of the new classless society. When
this synthesis of competing economic classes is achieved the co-
ercive power of the state and its concomitant laws become un-
necessary. The state is not abolished, it "withers away."
May, 1965
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How are these concepts reflected in Soviet Jurisprudence?
When the Russian Revolution occurred in 1917 and the initial
confusion and chaotic conditions caused by a foreign war and
civil strife ended, Lenin temporarily abandoned the doctrinaire
principles of Marxism in an effort to put the country back on its
feet. The creation of a society of equals living in the midst of
abundance failed to materialize, and Lenin permitted a certain
amount of private industry and private trade to restock the eco-
nomic larders. Thus, together with state-owned industries and
utilities, Lenin created a mixed system of public and private
ownership called the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.). This policy
was considered contrary to the spirit of Marxism and eventually
the entire economy was recast, with the complete abolition of
the profit motive, into an economic plan directed from a single
center and applicable to the total territory of the state.
Lenin regarded the state as a mechanism of constraint which
subjected people to systematic violence. He went further than
Marx when he stated that the essence of the state is its police,
army and navy. However, consistent with Marxian ideology, the
state to Lenin was only a transient phase. After the complete
success of the proletarian revolution, a new era would dawn in
which the need for a state apparatus would vanish.
In spite of this totalitarian view, Lenin tolerated semi-
independent speculation regarding the nature of law. The first
step in attempting to develop a specific Soviet theory of law was
P. L. Stuchka's The Revolutionary Part Played by Law and the
State: A General Doctrine of Law, published in 1921. Stuchka
defined law as a system of social relationships corresponding to
the interests of the dominant class and safeguarded by its organ-
ized force. The salient feature and one which caused its later
repudiation was his emphasis on the "social" basis of the law.
Stuchka thought that there was a "natural law" growing out of
social intercourse. This "natural law" had precedence over
"artificial law" consisting of statutes and governmental decrees.
The echo of Lockean and non-socialistic views can be seen in
these ideas and Stuchka's theory was unacceptable to Marxian
dogmatists because it omitted any reference to the class struggle
and failed to provide for the ultimate phenomenon of a classless
society. It was eventually abandoned as an expression of Soviet
law and replaced by a psychological theory of law advanced by
M. A. Reisner in The Theory of Petrazhitskie: Marxism and So-
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cial Ideology. He thought that legal conduct stemmed from the
psychological experiences of men and saw its chief sanction not
in the application of force but in the "legal consciousness" and
instinctive sense of justice in men. The origin of the law was not
in any institution devised by men, but sprang from the collective
experience of communism and societies. Reisner tried to put a
Marxian base under this idea of intuitive law and attempted to
find the driving force of Soviet law in the "revolutionary legal
consciousness" of the workers inspired by the ideal of universal
equality. Reisner's emphasis on the individual conscience had
no lasting effect on Soviet legal philosophy.
Chronologically, the next important juridical thinker was
E. B. Pashukanis, who in his General Theory of Law and Marx-
ism, in 1922, identified law in its most developed form with bour-
geois economics and culture. However, he felt that the Soviet
state, prior to attainment of full-fledged socialism, could not and
should not dispense with bourgeois forms of law. It was his
theory that any attempt to develop purely proletarian categories
of law in the Soviet Union was an exercise in futility because
the achievement of a truly socialist society would result in the
dying out of the law as an instrument of social regulation.
Pashukanis was convinced that the institution of law reaches its
highest and fullest development in a market economy in which
isolated and independent producers and owners of commodities
exchange their products by means of contracts. The interests of
these individuals frequently come into conflict and it is the func-
tion of the law to adjust these conflicting interests. Where there
is complete unity of social purpose undefiled by the clash of
contradictory interests, there would be no place for the law.
Thus, a railroad timetable, a hospital directive for treatment of
sick persons, or various other regulations designed to achieve
a collective purpose, do not operate under the color of law.
Therefore, any attempt to devise a socialist or proletarian theory
of law is not only futile but unnecessary.
When economic developments in the Soviet Union indicated
that the state was not going to "wither away," a reaction against
Pashukanis' theory resulted in his denunciation and he was
forced into a partial recantation. However, he continued to in-
sist that it was unnecessary for the Soviet Union to devise a
specific form of proletarian law since, with the socialization of
production, the disappearance of the law would begin immedi-
May, 1965
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ately. He disappeared from sight and may have been liquidated
during the great purges of the Thirties.
After 1930 there was a shift in Soviet legal thinking which
manifested itself in five ways:
(1) The economic concept of law, based on class, was replaced
by a primarily normative idea of law, directed toward the indi-
vidual. (2) An attempt was made to dilute the class element in
the Marxian view of the law by equating the interests of the
dominant class in the Soviet Union with the will of all the people.
(3) Consistent with the Marxian theory that law is an instru-
ment to support the ruling class, after the revolution and the
achievement of a classless society, law was pictured as a stabi-
lizer of the social order rather than an innovating force. (4) So-
cialist law was proclaimed as a new and distinct form of law and
(5) the withering away of the law was postponed indefinitely.
In short, where Marx had explained law in terms of the
relations between competing classes as the basic unit of the
state there was now a return to the Hegelian view of the state
as the basic unit of history since the class struggle had theoreti-
cally ceased to exist. In either case, it should be noted that the
individual remains subordinate to the state.
In 1938 a new definition of the law was formulated by A. Y.
Vyshinsky in The Law of the Soviet State. Vyshinsky's view
was that Soviet law was the aggregate of rules of conduct em-
bodied in statutes by the workers' government and reflecting
their will. These rules are enforced by the coercive power of the
Soviet state and are designed to strengthen the relationships be-
tween the workers and to destroy any vestiges of capitalism in
economic and social life in order to build a true communist
society.
The law still serves the economically dominant group which
is now the Soviet workers. Constraint is prominently featured
under Vyshinsky's theory as it was under Lenin who observed
that the law was nothing without a mechanism to enforce obe-
dience. Thus, law is regarded, as it was by Marx, as an institu-
tion designed to safeguard and perpetuate the interests of the
ruling class. However, this class has been expanded and broad-
ened so as to include the entire toiling mass.
Law is today viewed as a stabilizing force in Soviet society.
The concept of judges as policy makers is strongly rejected.
Their work is subordinate to statute. The courts are expected to
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play an important part in maintaining a sense of collective unity
and purpose in society.
Their task is conceived in terms of the education of the
people-the litigating parties, the spectators and indeed all of
society. Soviet judicial opinions tend to reflect a rather mechan-
ical mode of reasoning and the law is conceived as a body of
rather rigid rules which, when applied to the citizenry, makes
them ready and willing to carry out the collective spirit of
Marxism.
It may seem that the attempts of Soviet legal scholars to
build a philosophy of jurisprudence is an exercise in hypocrisy
to mask a brutal tyranny in which the personal rights of the
citizens are ruthlessly trampled by a totalitarian regime. But
Soviet law is not as oppressive as we have often been led to be-
lieve. That there are abuses, especially in the field of political
crimes, there can be no doubt, but otherwise the average indi-
vidual, if he is reasonably careful, does not live in constant ter-
ror of being shipped off to a corrective labor camp in Siberia.
The Soviet law is often described as parental. The children-
viz., the citizenry-have no "legal" control of the state. There
are no means of expressing effective opposition to the power of
the state. In contrast, our political-legal system embodying the
concept of individual rights as well as effective opposing political
forces, provides checks on governmental power. The Soviet state
is not bound by public opinion; it may recognize opinion but it
can and has ignored the wishes of the masses if it feels that an-
other goal is more important. This is consistent with the Hege-
lian and Marxist view of the individual as subordinate to the
state.
Nevertheless, the parental character of Soviet laws does not
limit it to arbitrary state action. Large numbers of prosecutions
are brought against officials for gross negligence of their duties,
and state organizations can be and are sued by individuals for
injuries to person or property and for breach of contract.
There are many contradictions in Soviet jurisprudence.
How, for example, does one reconcile the Marxian concept of
law as an "exploiter" of the toiling masses (the tool of the ruling
class) with any theory of Socialist law? Vyshinsky attempts to
reconcile this conflict by explaining that the new law is now the
tool of the general will and is the expression of a classless Marx-
ian society. There is no ruling class and the coercive power of
May, 1965
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the state is directed toward the non-conforming individual rather
than an exploited class. Yet, every society has contradictions.
The political absolutism of the Soviets does not destroy an other-
wise sound legal system. An illustration of our own country's
contradictions is to be found in the fact that in some places, in
spite of 100 years of guaranteed constitutional equality, Negroes
still are systematically deprived of the franchise, denied fair
trial, and are often the victims of unpunished violence. This
does not mean that law is non-existent in those areas. It simply
means that force and violence is tolerated in certain types of sit-
uations. This may have a deleterious effect on the legal system
as a whole, but it does not destroy it.
The biggest handicap to any more elastic form of Soviet
jurisprudence lies in its apparent necessity to base everything
on Marxian philosophy which has become a sacred dogma invul-
nerable to criticism. The leaders have become the captives of
their own dogma and cannot abandon their whole "raison
d'etat" without imperiling their own authority and prestige. In
any event, any changes in Soviet jurisprudence will have to
come about through political developments, rather than through
any radical and innovating philosophy based more on a concept
of individual freedom and less on deterministic philosophy.
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